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THE PROGNOSIS FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

A TEXAS PERSPECTIVE

Prepared by Arduin, Laffer & Moore Econometrics

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary	3
Introduction.....	4
Diagnosing the Health Care Industry: Strengths.....	6
The Health Care Wedge.....	7
Current Health Insurance Plans Worsen the Wedge.....	10
The Empirical Existence of the Wedge.....	10
Studies Demonstrate that Government Policies Are the Problem	14
The Consequences of Rising Health Care Costs.....	14
Distribution of Health Care Spending	15
President Obama’s Reforms Do Not Address the Root Causes of the Problem	17
Quantifying the Potential Economic Impacts	20
The Economic Impacts of Obama-Style Health Care on Texas	23
Solutions	24
Endnotes.....	26
Bibliography.....	27
About the Authors.....	28

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A TEXAS PERSPECTIVE

Executive Summary

In 1960, the private sector funded over three-quarters of the nation's health care expenditures. Individuals paid nearly one-half of the total national health care expenditures through out-of-pocket expenditures. Beginning in 1967, the way health care is purchased in the U.S. began to completely reverse itself:

- The private sector has been slowly funding less and less of the total national health expenditures; as of 2007 less than 54 percent of total national health care expenditures are paid for by the private sector.
- Reciprocally, the public sector has been slowly funding more and more of the total national health expenditures; as of 2007 public expenditures at the federal and state levels now fund nearly one-half of the total health care expenditures in the U.S.
- Total out-of-pocket expenditures have been plummeting as a share of total health expenditures at an even faster rate; today only a bit more than \$1 out of every \$10 spent on health care is being funded by individuals through out-of-pocket expenditures.

This has resulted in a large and growing government *health care wedge*—an economic separation of effort from reward, of consumers (patients) from producers (health care providers), caused by government policies. Rising government expenditures on health care are the main factor driving the growth in the wedge. The wedge is a primary driver in rising health care costs, i.e., inflation in medical costs.

President Barack Obama's principles to drastically alter U.S. health care policy—a public health insurance exchange, mandated minimum coverage, mandated coverage of preexisting conditions, required purchase of health insurance—do not address the growing wedge and its role as

the fundamental driver of health care costs. In fact, they will further increase the wedge, and can thus be expected to increase medical price inflation.

Specifically, the planned \$1 trillion increase in federal government health subsidies over 10 years based on President Obama's principles will have the following consequences:

- Overall, total federal expenditures will be 5.6 percent higher than otherwise by 2019, adding \$285.6 billion to the federal deficit in 2019.
- An increase in national health care expenditures by an additional 8.9 percent by 2019.
- An increase in medical price inflation by 5.2 percent above what it would have been otherwise by 2019.
- A reduction in U.S. economic growth in 2019 compared to the baseline scenario by 4.9 percent for the nation as a whole and 4.7 percent in Texas.
- Higher medical inflation and overall expenditures will ultimately lead to government expenditures that exceed the \$1 trillion in expenditures on health subsidies. The net present value of all additional federal government expenditures through 2019 that will occur as a result of federal health care reform is \$1.2 trillion, or a \$3,900 bill for every man, woman, and child in the U.S.
- In addition to federally-funded expenditures, the net present value of all Texas state government expenditures through 2019 that will occur as a result of a federal health care reform is \$8.9 billion, or a \$365 bill for every man, woman, and child in Texas.
- The current net present value of funding health care reform based on President Obama's priorities will be \$4,265 for every person in Texas. This comes

to a total net present value of \$103.8 billion in total costs that Texans will have to bear.

- Despite the additional \$1 trillion in expected health care subsidies by the government, 30 million people would remain uninsured. The cost to reduce the number of uninsured by 16 million people is \$62,500 in subsidy expenditures per person insured.
- The cost on Texas could be higher, and the national cost lower, if the federal government pushes the financial responsibility for covering the expansion of lower income individual's health insurance coverage off to the states. Such a move would shift a total of \$28.2 billion (the net present value being \$21.7 billion) in cost from the federal government to Texas taxpayers.

Introduction

"In 2009, health care reform is not a luxury. It's a necessity we cannot defer. Soaring health care costs make our current course unsustainable. It is unsustainable for our families ... It is unsustainable for businesses."

– President Barack Obama

President Obama is correct when he says that "soaring health care costs make our current course unsustainable." Adjusting for the growing U.S. population, the dollar level of expenditures on health care has exceeded the growth in overall consumer prices in the economy every year for nearly the past 50 years. Such a trend cannot continue forever.

Americans agree that health care reform is necessary. For instance, 55 percent of respondents to a recent *CNN* poll think the U.S. health care system needs a great deal of reform.¹ Yet more than 8 out of 10 Americans are satisfied with their current health care arrangements.²

Such results are not contradictory. Consumers are satisfied with their current health care arrangements because they are receiving quality medical care at little direct cost to themselves. Yet they understand that the runaway costs driven by this arrangement have to be addressed before the system collapses.

Part of the blame falls upon waste, fraud, and abuse in the health care system itself. These factors cost the system an estimated \$700 billion in 2007, or more than \$2,300 per le-

gal U.S. resident. Another primary cost driver is a large and growing government *health care wedge*—an economic separation of effort from reward, or consumers (patients) from producers (health care providers), caused by government policies.

The health care wedge is one way of thinking about government involvement in the economy. When the government or a third party spends money on health care, the patient does not. The patient is then separated from the transaction in the sense that the costs are no longer his concern. This separation—how far the supplier and consumer are separated from one another—is what the economic wedge is measuring. The wedge measures the deadweight loss from this separation in higher costs that do not improve efficiency.

In the case of health care, the wedge also separates patients from doctors in determining what type of care should be provided. Decisions are made by government, insurers, and judges deciding medical malpractice liabilities. The government, lawyer, and third party wedge in our current health care system causes higher costs and diminished efficiency.

Health care reform should be based on policies that diminish, not increase, this wedge.

From a macroeconomic perspective, a tax wedge diminishes incentives to work, save, and produce; consequently less work, savings, and production results. Yet at the same time, the wedge increases incentives to consume and spend, since the costs of consumption are not directly borne by the one making the decisions. Such basic fundamentals of economics are not repealed at the entrance to the hospital or the doctor's waiting room. The result: higher costs and diminished efficiency.

The primary government policy causing the wedge is the ever-increasing role of government in funding health care, a factor that corresponds directly with the diminishing role of the private sector, particularly, health care consumers.

Since 1967, the private sector has been funding less and less of total national health expenditures—less than 54 percent as of 2007. Public outlays (at the federal and state levels) now account for nearly one-half of total U.S. health care expenditures. Meanwhile, total out-of-pocket expenditures have been plummeting even faster as a share of total health expenditures.

Taken together, these trends illustrate the complete reversal of the way health care is purchased in the U.S. In 1960, the private sector funded over three-quarters of the national health care expenditures. Individuals paid from their own pockets nearly half of these costs. Today, individual patients cover just over \$1 of every \$10 spent on health care.

Although reform is necessary, ill-advised reforms can make things much worse. Health care policy reformers should proceed in the same manner that doctors treat patients. Doctors must properly diagnosis the disease or affliction so as to understand the likely effects of a proposed course of treatment. Likewise, health care reformers who have the public interest in mind will correctly diagnose the problem, showing how reform will restore a flagging health care system to robust health.

A proper diagnosis begins with the 85 percent of Americans who say they are satisfied with their current health care arrangements and thereby remind us that we are not facing a crisis in access to health care or in health insurance coverage. Reformers must ensure that changes to help the remaining 15 percent of Americans do not make the vast majority of Americans worse off.

In fact, the disease weighing down the health care industry is costs that are spiraling out of control. These care costs are driven to a large extent by the health care wedge. Rising government expenditures on health care are one of the main factors driving the growth in the health care wedge.

The President and his advisors have misdiagnosed the problems of the health care system. Health care reforms based on President Obama's criteria fail to address the fundamental driver of health care costs—the health care wedge.

The likely impact from the combination of generous federal subsidies and a new public insurance option is a significant reduction in people's incentives to monitor costs and a significant increase in the costs of administering the public program. In short, these policies will further increase the wedge. The growing health expenditure wedge is strongly correlated with inflation in medical costs.

Reforms based on President Obama's priorities can thus be expected to weaken the health care system and increase medical price inflation. The actual health care reform proposal under consideration is fluid as of this writing. Proposals range from:

- A gross \$1.6 trillion expenditure contained in Senator Edward M. Kennedy's health care reform proposal.
- A \$1 trillion expenditure in the House Tri-Committee Group reform.
- A simple expansion of Medicaid eligibility at an estimated cost of \$600 billion, much or all of it borne by state governments.

The exact impact on Texas will vary depending upon which route is taken and whether the federal reform proposal attempts to cover the costs or shift these costs to the states.

We assess here the impact of a reform proposal that significantly expands government's role in the health care market through 1) providing an additional \$1 trillion in federal subsidies over 10 years, and 2) offering incentives to move current Medicaid recipients into a new federal health insurance program. Such a program would:

- Increase national health care expenditures by an additional 8.9 percent by 2019.
- Increase medical price inflation by 5.2 percent above what it would have been otherwise due to the higher national expenditures by 2019.
- Pressure the federal and Texas state budget due to the increased expenditure levels and increased medical inflation.
- Higher medical inflation and overall expenditures will ultimately lead to government expenditures that exceed the \$1 trillion in expenditures on health subsidies. The net present value of all additional federal government expenditures through 2019 that will occur as a result of federal health care reform is \$1.2 trillion, or a \$3,900 bill for every man, woman, and child in the U.S.
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ties will be \$4,265 for every person in Texas. This comes to a total net present value of \$103.8 billion in total costs that Texans will have to bear.

- The cost on Texas could be higher, and the national cost lower, if the federal government pushes the financial responsibility for covering the expansion of lower income individual's health insurance coverage off to the states. Such a move would shift a total of \$28.2 billion (the net present value being \$21.7 billion) in cost from the federal government to Texas taxpayers.
- Reduce economic growth in 2019 compared to the baseline scenario by 4.9 percent for the nation as a whole and 4.7 percent for Texas.

Sharply higher health care costs would force people off private insurance and into the government plan. Further, as we know, the government rarely competes on a level playing field with private companies and firms. Always, the government tilts the field in its favor. A government plan embodying the Obama priorities would operate with guaranteed taxpayer subsidies. These would pressure the health care industry to price at uneconomical levels in order to meet political goals regardless of economic merit or viability. This would further reduce the number of Americans with private health care insurance.

In consequence, the increase in the number of people on the government plan would not reflect a corresponding decrease in the number of uninsured individuals. A \$1 trillion plan based on President Obama's criteria would still leave 30 million people uninsured.³ The cost to reduce the number of uninsured, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office, is \$62,500 per person.

Such a negative economic assessment is consistent with the Massachusetts experience following the state's recent health care reforms. These share common ground with the Obama principles of a government-sponsored health care exchange, an individual mandate, and generous subsidies.

For all the hopeful rhetoric they occasioned, the Massachusetts reforms have seriously strained the state budget. Although supporters claimed that the reforms would reduce the price of individual insurance policies, "insurance premiums rose by 7.4 percent in 2007, 8-12 percent in 2008, and are expected to rise 9 percent this year."⁴

The following analysis links the problems in our current health care system to the rising wedge between patients and medical providers. From this link it is clear that reforms based on President Obama's priorities would only exacerbate our health care problems. Reform efforts need to be more carefully crafted and considered than have been the plans based on President Obama's priorities.

Congress needs to focus on reform that promotes protection of what Americans want and demand most: immediate, measurable ways to make health care more accessible and affordable without jeopardizing quality, individual choice, or personalized care.

Diagnosing the Health Care Industry: Strengths

Before addressing the adverse incentives and outcomes from the current U.S. health care system, it is worthwhile to quickly summarize its most important strengths. According to the U.S. Census, 45.7 million people in the U.S. did not have health insurance in 2007 (down from 47 million in 2006).⁵ Another way of putting it: 255.6 million people (or 85 percent of the population) had insurance in 2007, up from 251.4 million in 2006.⁶ A majority of these people are satisfied with their current coverage, which is offered by one of the approximately 1,300 separate health insurance companies that operate in the U.S.⁷ According to a recent *CNN* poll:

"Most Americans like their health care coverage but are not happy with the overall cost of health care..."

More than eight in 10 Americans questioned in a CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Thursday said they're satisfied with the quality of health care they receive.

And nearly three out of four said they're happy with their overall health care coverage.

But satisfaction drops to 52 percent when it comes to the amount people pay for their health care, and more than three out of four are dissatisfied with the total cost of health care in the United States.⁸

Such feelings are not new. A 2004 Harris Interactive poll found:

For the fifth time in six years, Harris Interactive has asked the insured public to rate their own insurance plans. Two-thirds of them continue to give their plans an A or a B, with only 10% giving them a D or an F. Substantial but not overwhelming majorities continue to say that they would recommend their own health plans to family members who are basically healthy (76%) or who have a serious or chronic illness (68%).⁹

Using the latest *CNN* and Census data, if 85 percent of Americans have health insurance, and 80 percent of Americans are satisfied with their current health quality, then approximately 70 percent of Americans are satisfied with their current arrangements. Care must be taken to ensure that changes to help 15 percent of Americans do not make the vast majority of Americans worse off.

The fact that such large percentages of the population are insured, and at the same time are satisfied with their insurance, is clear evidence that the U.S. health care system does not face a crisis of coverage or quality. Reforms that treat access to health care or health insurance coverage as if they were in crisis fundamentally misread the positive aspects of the current health care system and, consequently, risk breaking the parts of the health care system that are currently working.

The Health Care Wedge

The health care system is facing serious problems. These problems, which impose significant hardships on many individuals, need correction. Correcting the problems with the current health care system begins with an understanding of incentives to invest one's money one way or another. Incentives drive all economic behavior—including behavior in the health care industry. The cost and quality of health care goods and services respond to the interaction of consumers (patients) and suppliers (doctors and medical product suppliers).

The health care wedge is one way of thinking about government involvement in the economy. When the government or a third party spends money on health care, the patient does not. The patient is then separated from the transaction in the sense that the costs are no longer his concern. This separation—how far the supplier and consumer are separated from one another—is what the economic wedge is measuring. The wedge measures the deadweight loss from this separation in higher costs that do not improve efficiency.

In the case of health care, the wedge also separates patients from doctors in determining what type of care should be provided. Decisions are made by government, insurers, and judges deciding medical malpractice liabilities. The government, lawyer, and third party wedge in our current health care system causes higher costs and diminished efficiency.


One of the most basic axioms of economics examines changes in behavior when prices change. When the price of a product increases, consumers have an incentive to consume less while suppliers simultaneously have an incentive to produce more. When prices are obscured by government interference in the marketplace, neither consumers nor suppliers have the necessary knowledge to properly allocate society's scarce resources.

An economic wedge occurs any time government policies separate effort from reward or consumers from producers. When government, lawyers, or third party insurance is responsible for paying the bills, consumers have no incentive to control costs. It is intrinsically an economic variable that operates at the margin where incentives come into play and decisions are made. Economic wedges inevitably change economic incentives, oftentimes leading to undesirable outcomes. The burden of government on the growth of the private sector economy illustrates the costs associated with economic wedges.

Government spending relative to the size of the private sector economy (the government expenditure wedge) is a proxy for the total burden of government activities on the economy. Figure 1 (next page) tracks the growth in the government expenditure wedge between 1951 and 2007 (the latest full data set available). As of 2007, total government expenditures were \$4.4 trillion. Net domestic business output (corporate and non-corporate income adjusted for depreciation) for 2007 was \$9.5 trillion. The resulting government expenditure wedge for 2007 was 46.1 percent.

The vertical black lines in Figure 1 represent the years in which changes in the path of the government expenditure wedge are evident. For instance, total government expenditures between 1951 and 1965 ranged from relatively flat to more expansive. Beginning in 1966, there is a change in the rate of expenditure growth that continued until 1983. The growth in government expenditures then slowed until 1989. A renewed, but short-lived, pick-up in government expenditures occurred between 1989 and 1993. The trend toward lower government expenditures

Figure 1: Total Federal, State, and Local Government Expenditure Wedge, 1951-2007¹⁰



then resumed until 2001. Since then, total government expenditures have risen.

Table 1 illustrates the negative impact that a high and/or growing government expenditure wedge has on private sector activity, as well as the positive impact of a lower and/or declining expenditure wedge. Taking each period separately:

- Between 1950 and 1965, the government expenditure wedge was relatively low (32.4 percent) and grew slightly (+5.5 percentage points). Private sector expansion was a robust 3.6 percent per year during this period.
- Between 1965 and 1983, the government expenditure wedge grew quickly, rising 16.6 percentage points to 49 percent. Growth in the private sector slowed to 2.5 percent per year.

- Between 1983 and 1988, growth in the private sector accelerated to 5.1 percent per year as the government expenditure wedge fell 3.3 points back down to 45.7 percent.
- The brief reversal in the government expenditure wedge between 1988 and 1992 led to a 5.2 percentage point rise in the wedge to 50.9 percent. Growth in the private sector economy slowed again to 1 percent per year.
- Between 1992 and 2000, the government expenditure wedge fell 9.2 percentage points to 41.7 percent. Growth in the private sector economy accelerated again to 4.5 percent per year.
- Finally, between 2000 and 2007, the growth in the government expenditure wedge started growing again (by 4.5 percentage points to 46.1 percent) and the growth rate in the private sector cooled to 2 percent.

Taken together, Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate the consequences from the overall government wedge on total economic growth. By separating effort from reward, a large or growing government wedge diminishes the incentive to work, save, and produce; less work, savings, and production results. Such basic fundamentals of economics are not repealed at the health care industry's doorstep.

In order to correctly diagnose the current problems in the health care industry, one must first understand the incentives driving the people and organizations participating in the health care market. Understanding the incentives pinpoints the current weaknesses of the U.S. health care in-

Table 1: Negative Relationship Between Expenditure Wedge and Private Sector Growth, 1950-2007¹¹

	% Change Net Business Output (CAGR)	Wedge at End of Period	Change Wedge (peak to trough, trough to peak)
1950-1965	3.6%	32.4%	5.5%
1965-1983	2.5%	49.0%	16.6%
1983-1988	5.1%	45.7%	-3.3%
1988-1992	1.0%	50.9%	5.2%
1992-2000	4.5%	41.7%	-9.2%
2000-2007	2.0%	46.1%	4.5%

dustry and provides the basis for developing a methodology to assess the impacts from proposed reforms on both the problems in particular, and the health care industry overall.

Our current third party payer system creates a wedge that separates consumers from suppliers. Larger wedges create larger gaps between consumers and suppliers and lead to greater market inefficiencies and a larger number of adverse incentives. Many of the problems with our current health care system stem from the adverse incentives created by the wedge between consumers and suppliers.

On the consumer side of the market, the wedge diminishes consumers' incentives to monitor costs. Consumers bear only a fraction of the costs from any additional health care service. On the supplier side, doctors and other medical providers receive no incentive to provide higher quality services for less cost. No positive benefit accrues to those who do so.

One of the most important disincentives for doctors to monitor costs is the tort liability threat. According to the American Medical Association, defensive medicine in response to rising tort liability costs added \$99 billion to \$179 billion in additional costs in 2005 alone.¹²

As a result, Medicare, Medicaid, and tax-favored, employer-based coverage blind both patient and doctor to the cost of care. Meanwhile, litigation risks incentivize doctors to run additional tests to limit their liability exposure. Government regulations and the third party payer system are also diminishing the market incentives to implement best practices programs that would help eliminate waste, fraud, and abuse. Whether the payer is government or an insurance company, the process removes competition and patient feedback that drives innovation.

Take, as an example, programs to implement best practices, or comparative effectiveness research. Comparative effectiveness research evaluates different medical procedures and treatments for the purpose of educating doctors and patients about which treatments are effective and economical; and which treatments are not. An oft-cited complaint of the current U.S. health care system—a complaint not without merit—concerns the lack of sound comparative effectiveness research.

Cannon (2009) illustrates that removing government-created obstructions is a more effective policy reform to create comparative effectiveness research than the creation of a new government agency—an important principle supported by the President.

The President's principles call for a government agency to provide comparative effectiveness research, claiming a market failure has occurred. According to this theory, once comparative effectiveness research is known, it is difficult to keep out of the public domain. Organizations' incentives to invest in this research are diminished by the prospect of competitors benefiting from their private research at no cost to themselves. Consequently, organizations will naturally under-invest in comparative effectiveness research, according to this theory.

Cannon (2009) illustrates that the current lack of comparative effectiveness research represents the failure, not of the market, but of government.¹³ For instance, prepaid group plans (PGPs) have a large incentive to provide comparative effectiveness research to their members because the benefits of the research can be effectively captured within their networks of doctors and facilities. However, government regulations and the complex web of state regulations discourage PGPs. On the demand side, the declining amount of out-of-pocket expenditures by consumers reduces their demand for comparative effectiveness research. Because consumers do not bear the costs or reap the benefits of ensuring the most cost-effective practices, their incentives to seek those benefits are accordingly lessened. Taken together, government interventions have deadened the incentives to create comparative effectiveness research.

Cannon explains that, by definition, government agencies are subject to political influence. The record of government agencies from the Federal Reserve Bank, to the Securities & Exchange Commission, to the National Center for Health Care Technology shows that political influence has created periodic conflicts in which the agencies' mission and/or independence came under extreme pressure. Because more effective means exist to create this valuable research, the best way to create sound comparative effectiveness research isn't to commission it from government but, rather, to remove the government obstructions preventing its creation.

Current Health Insurance Plans Worsen the Wedge

Most Americans do not have health *insurance* as the term is traditionally understood. Insurance is a tool for managing risk. In exchange for periodic payments from a customer, an insurance company provides protection against a large but uncertain potential cost.

Take disability insurance. A potential risk for many families is the possibility that the primary (or one of the dual-income earners) might meet with an accident that prevents him or her from working for a prolonged period of time. In such a case, a family could face potential financial ruin. To protect against this risk, many primary income earners will purchase a disability insurance policy. In return for annual (or quarterly/monthly) payments to the insurance company, the company will pay a pre-determined amount of money to the income earner should an unfortunate accident or disabling illness occur.

Health insurance does not work this way. As opposed to covering only true health risks (the costs associated with broken arms or major surgeries), health insurance pays the costs for routine health events that are not risks in the true sense of the word. An analogous situation would be for disability insurance plans to pay an individual's disability claims for missing work due to a cold. The basic principles of risk and insurance have been distorted. The expected result from this distortion is diminished quality and increased prices.

Imagine if another form of insurance, such as automobile insurance, worked like health insurance. As opposed to covering the costs from major automobile accidents, costs of routine maintenance such as oil changes and tune ups would also be covered. Additionally, to ensure that car owners are all treated equally, insurance companies would be prohibited from charging different rates for specific drivers who cause more accidents, or from charging different rates to groups with different driving habits—married women in their 50s, for instance, who might qualify for lower rates than single 18 year-old males.

If indeed automobile insurance worked like health insurance, safe drivers would end up paying more for automobile insurance to subsidize the costs of unsafe drivers. Car consumers would also have no incentive to shop for the best deal when it came to changing the car's oil, getting


a tune up, or performing any other routine maintenance service. The cost for routine maintenance services would be expected to increase. Additionally, because a car owner would not bear costs resulting from improper maintenance, the incentive to properly maintain cars would decline. The number of major car repairs, and the cost of these repairs, would all be expected to increase as well.

Automobile insurance companies, trying to arrest the rising costs of car repairs and car maintenance, would begin to increase the amount of rules and regulations. The result would be significant market distortions in the automobile insurance market, skyrocketing costs of repairs, and an increase in the quantity of major repairs. In short, both the automobile insurance market and the automobile repair market would become much more inefficient to the point where people might even begin to wonder whether the automobile repair market is special, needing the government to mandate prices and repair schedules.

The Empirical Existence of the Wedge

The empirical data confirm the expected outcomes from the wedge in the health care market: health care expenditures and costs are rising faster than our economy. According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, total national health expenditures accounted for more than 16 percent of our economy in 2007 (see Figure 2); and are expected to be about 18 percent of GDP in 2009.¹⁴

Figure 2: National Health Expenditures as Percentage of GDP, 1960-2007¹⁵




The rise in health care expenditures as a share of the U.S. economy has not been even. Significant growth has followed years of relative flat growth. In particular, health care expenditure growth was steady relative to overall U.S. economic growth in the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and through

most of the 1990s. In between the periods of steady health expenditures were years of rapid health expenditure growth.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or total national income, is a measure of people’s ability to pay for goods and services. The recent housing bubble vividly demonstrated that expenditures on a good or service cannot consistently outpace people’s ability to pay forever. The same is true for health care. The consistent excessive growth of health care expenditures, compared to the economy’s ability to pay, is the major weakness of the current health care system. All other problems (e.g., lack of insurance coverage and medical bankruptcy) find their genesis in the uncontrolled rise in health care expenditures. Consequently, beneficial health care reform must begin with an understanding of the trends and drivers of health care expenditures.

Part of the health care wedge is created by government expenditures substituting for private expenditures; another part by the private third party payment system. Figure 3 shows that the government-created wedge has been growing significantly since 1965.


Figure 3: National, Private, and Public Health Expenditures as Percentage of GDP, 1960-2007¹⁶



The rise of government spending has been at the expense of private spending in the health care market. In 1960, over 75 percent of total health expenditures in the U.S. were funded by private expenditures. Beginning in 1966, with the passage of Medicare, the private sector’s role in the health care market began to change. In 1965, the private sector was still funding over 75 percent of total national health expenditures. This fell to 70 percent in 1966, and 63 percent in 1967. Since 1967, the private sector has been slowly funding less and less of the total national health expenditures; and as of 2007, less than 54 percent of total national health care expenditures are paid for by the private sector.

Public expenditures (at the federal and state levels) now fund nearly one-half of the total health care expenditures in the U.S. Along with these trends, total out-of-pocket expenditures have been plummeting even faster as a share of total health expenditures (see Figure 4). It is important to note that while total out-of-pocket expenditures have been declining as a share of total national health expenditures, they have grown in total inflation-adjusted terms. *Despite the government covering a growing share of total health care expenditures, individuals continued to pay more than ever before in total dollar terms.*


Figure 4: Out-of-Pocket Expenditures as Percentage of Total National Health Expenditures, 1960-2007¹⁷



Taken together, these trends illustrate a complete reversal in the way health care is purchased in the U.S. In 1960, the private sector funded over three-quarters of national health care expenditures, with individuals responsible for nearly one-half of these costs through out-of-pocket expenditures. Today, the private sector funds just a bit more than one-half of these expenditures, with only a bit more than \$1 out of every \$10 coming out of the consumer’s pocket.

Rising government expenditures on health care have been a primary driver of the overall government expenditure wedge illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 5 (next page) breaks down the government expenditure wedge trends broken down by government health care expenditures and all other government expenditures. Figure 5 demonstrates two important trends. First, the government expenditure wedge outside of health care, although volatile, is currently only 5 percentage points higher than the 1960 wedge (35.3 percent compared to 30.1 percent). The remaining 9.1 percentage point increase in the government expenditure wedge is due to rising health care expenditures.

Figure 5: Total Federal, State, and Local Government Expenditure Wedge Health Care Compared to All Other Government Expenditures, 1960-2007¹⁸




Second, health care expenditures have been an important driving force in the overall government expenditure wedge. Table 1 identified three main periods of a rising government expenditure wedge: 1965-1983, 1988-1992, and 2000-2007. Health care expenditures drove the rising government expenditure wedge during each one of these periods, the importance of which has been growing over time.

- Between 1965 and 1983, the total government expenditure wedge rose 16.6 percentage points, 26 percent of which was caused by rising health care expenditures.
- Between 1988 and 1992, the total government expenditure wedge rose 5.2 percentage points, 41 percent of which was caused by rising health care expenditures.
- Between 2000 and 2007, the total government expenditure wedge rose 4.5 percentage points, 51 percent of which was caused by rising health care expenditures.

Government health care expenditures are clearly driving the government expenditure wedge higher. A rising government expenditure wedge diminishes growth in the private sector economy, however. This link has important implications with respect to beneficial health care reforms. Health care reforms based on President Obama’s priorities lead to large increases in government expenditures on health care without removing the negative consumer and supplier incentives. The consequences are significant increases in government expenditures and subsequent decreases in economic growth.

The adverse incentives created by the growing separation between consumers and suppliers are manifested most prominently through the skyrocketing health care costs. The relatively larger growth in health care expenditures is outpacing growth in overall consumer prices in the economy (see Figure 6). Adjusting for the growing U.S. population, the dollar level of expenditures on health care has exceeded the growth in prices in the economy each year for nearly the past 50 years.

Figure 6: Percent Change in Per Capita National Health Expenditures Compared to Percent Increase in Consumer Prices, 1960-2007¹⁹



The cost of health care on individuals in the economy goes beyond simply the current dollar outlays individuals must pay themselves. The individual cost of health care includes the loss of monetary income to fund health insurance plans through employers and the extra tax burdens that have been levied in order to fund the public health expenditures.

Health insurance expenditures have been rising as a share of disposable personal income, with premiums “paid,” in large measure, by employers or other third parties such as the government. For instance, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 59 percent of people under the age of 65 receive health insurance through work.²⁰ In 2006, the average employer cost for a family was \$11,941 (in 2008 dollars).²¹

The rising burden from increasing health insurance costs can be seen as a share of total business costs and in government budgets. The Bureau of Economic Analysis tracks total costs on health care in a category called “supplements to wages.” These costs incorporate all of the expenses that firms pay to employees other than wages—health insurance being a major component of these costs.

In 1960, most of an employee’s compensation was in the form of actual cash. Of total personal income earned (a figure that includes wages, benefits, interest earnings, capital gains, dividends, etc.), wages accounted for approximately two-thirds (66.3 percent) of total personal income. Supplements to wages were a relatively small 5.7 percent. The share of income represented by wages fell over this time period to 54.5 percent by 2007, while supplements to wages rose steadily to 12.5 percent.

More important, perhaps, the decline in wages as a share of personal income increases when the growth in health expenditures accelerates, and moderates when the growth in health expenditures moderates. Supplements to wages (e.g., health insurance) move in the opposite direction as wages. When growth in health expenditures accelerates, so does growth in supplements as a form of compensation. When growth in health expenditures moderates, growth in supplements as a form of compensation moderates likewise.

Figure 7 illustrates this trend. The red solid line in Figure 7 is the percentage change in health care expenditures. The black dotted line is the difference between the changes in wages as a share of personal income and the change in supplements to wages as a share of personal income. When the black dotted line is positive, the category of wages as a share of personal income is growing faster than supplements to wages. When the black dotted line is negative, supplements to wages as a share of personal income grow faster than wages.

Figure 7: Change in Health Care Expenditures Compared to Change in Wages as Share of Personal Income and Change in Supplements to Wages (health insurance & pensions) as Share of Personal Income, 1961-2007²²





Figure 7 clearly shows that when health care expenditure growth accelerates, supplements to wages are growing faster than wages. The reverse happens when health care expenditure growth slows. This pattern illustrates the dampening impact that out-of-control health expenditures has been having on monetary wages for American workers. Growing health care expenditure happens at the expense of growth in monetary wages, limiting workers’ welfare by reducing their expenditure power outside of health care services.

The same can be true of the federal and state governments. Figure 8 traces the growth in health care expenditures as a share of federal, state, and local expenditures. Whereas health expenditures made up only 4.5 percent of total government expenditures (or less than \$1 in \$20) in 1960, by 2007 they were 20.3 percent of total government expenditures (or more than \$1 in \$5). These expenditures alone required the government to take 7.7 percent of all personal income earned in 2007 just to pay for the country’s public health expenditures.

Figure 8: Total Federal, State, and Local Health Expenditures as Percentage of Total Government Expenditures, 1960-2007²³



Rising health care expenditures have led to:

- Rising tax burdens to fund the government portion of health care spending;
- Slower relative wage growth to fund the rising employer portion of this spending; and
- Rising health insurance outlays as a share of individuals’ take-home pay.

All of these costs more than overwhelm the reduction in direct out-of-pocket expenditures as a share of take-home pay, creating a larger, and accelerating, health care burden on individuals.

Studies Demonstrate that Government Policies Are the Problem

Research into the causes of the excessive health care price increases concludes that government policies are the primary reason why prices are growing excessively and coverage is so distorted. Consequently, the most effective method of controlling the excessive price increases is to remove those policies that are causing the excessive price increases in the first place.

The real alternative to today's health care system isn't the intrusion of federal power into the process, as presently proposed in Washington, D.C. The real alternative is the removal of government regulation and the consequent encouragement of robust competition among health care services and insurance products.

The impact from government policies on the health care market is of two kinds—direct and indirect. The direct impact refers to the direct government medical spending policies that are directly increasing health care costs. The indirect impact results from government interference that eliminates incentives for individuals or medical professionals to engage in economizing behavior that would increase quality and decrease costs in the health care field.

MIT economics professor Amy Finkelstein (2007) and University of Illinois economics professor Jeffrey Brown, along with Finkelstein (2008), establish a direct link between government Medicare and Medicaid expenditures and rising health care prices or other distortions that limit the efficiency of the health care market.²⁴

Finkelstein (2007) illustrates that of the six-fold increase in per capita health care spending that occurred between 1950 and 1990, one-half of this increase could be explained by the impact of Medicare along with Medicare's impact on the spread of health insurance more generally.

Brown and Finkelstein (2008) show that Medicaid imposes a powerful crowding-out effect on private insurance purchases. Specifically, they find "that the provision of even very incomplete public insurance can crowd out more compre-

hensive private policies by imposing a large implicit tax on private insurance benefits, thus potentially increasing overall risk exposure for individuals."²⁵ These results show that the growing government involvement in the health care industry has helped drive up health care expenditures.

The President's Council of Economic Advisors has cited the incentive problem as one of the key drivers of the excessive health care inflation, saying:

While health insurance provides valuable financial protection against high costs associated with medical treatment, current benefit designs often blunt consumer sensitivity with respect to prices, quality, and choice of care setting. There is well documented evidence that individuals respond to lower cost-sharing by using more care, as well as more expensive care, when they do not face the full price of their decisions at the point of utilization. Additionally, most insurance benefit designs do not include direct financial incentives to enrollees for choosing physicians, hospitals, and diagnostic testing facilities that are higher quality and lower cost.²⁶


Accordingly, it is necessary to change the adverse incentives on consumers so that they become price-sensitive when purchasing health care—and thus help, by their individual decisions, to contain out-of-control health care costs. The same logic holds for the adverse incentives the current system places on insurance companies, doctors, and other health care providers.

The Consequences of Rising Health Care Costs

Higher expenditure growth can arise for three reasons. Either the price of the service is increasing; the quantity of the services consumed is increasing; or a combination of both. In the case of health care, it is a combination of both, but especially of rising prices. Specifically, the total quantity of goods in the U.S. economy increased 377 percent between 1960 and 2008. The total quantity of medical services increased 712 percent or less than twice as much. However, prices in the U.S. economy increased just 490 percent, while prices of medical services soared 1,239 percent—nearly 2.5 times as much.

Figure 9 compares the rising medical prices and medical consumption to total national medical expenditures. The rising national medical expenditures is clearly a combina-

Figure 9: Percent Change in Per Capita National Health Expenditures Compared to Percent Increase in Medical Services Prices and the Quantity of Medical Services Consumed, 1960-2008²⁷



tion of both rising costs and rising consumption, but rising costs are clearly the major driver of rising health care expenditures.

Figure 10 illustrates the high growth in health care costs compared to inflation since 1998. Rising prices for medical and hospital services are driving medical inflation. The fact that the cost of medical and hospital services are driving price increases for medical care is not unexpected. These are the sectors most burdened by regulations and affected most by the insurance market. Consequently, it is expected that the areas subject to the largest excessive price pressures are the markets most affected by the insurance issue. In fact, those markets least affected by insurance—medical services related to eye glasses—are precisely the health care costs exhibiting the least amount of price pressures.

Figure 10: Cumulative Growth in Health Care Prices by Category, 1998-2008²⁸





Figure 11 relates the medical price inflation back to the wedge and adverse incentives created by the current system. When expenditures that are covered by either the insurance company or the government increase relative to national health expenditures, medical price inflation accelerates. When these expenditures fall relative to national health expenditures, medical price inflation slows. Accelerating medical inflation, consequently, is strongly correlated with a growing separation (wedge) in the medical market between doctors and patients. Reform policies that increase this separation, such as those reforms based on President Obama’s priorities, can be expected to increase pressures on medical price inflation.

Figure 11: Growth in Health Expenditures Not Out-of-Pocket as Share of National Health Expenditures Compared to Medical Price Inflation, 1968-2007²⁹



Distribution of Health Care Spending

It is important to note that the distribution of total health care spending is not even. According to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ):


...actual spending [on health care] is distributed unevenly across individuals, different segments of the population, specific diseases, and payers. For example, analysis of health care spending shows that:

- Five percent of the population accounts for almost half (49 percent) of total health care expenses.
- The 15 most expensive health conditions account for 44 percent of total health care expenses.

- Patients with multiple chronic conditions cost up to seven times as much as patients with only one chronic condition.³⁰

The Kaiser Family Foundation notes that, “At the other end of the spectrum, the one-half of the population with the lowest health spending accounts for just over 3 percent of spending.”³¹ Figure 12 reproduces the data from the AHRQ study illustrating how the vast majority of the total health care spending (that is, the consumers of the service) is created by a small percentage of the U.S. population. Controlling spending, therefore, requires controlling the spending by the 5 percent of the population spending one-half of all health care expenditures.

Figure 12: Percent of Total Health Care Expenditures by Percent of the Population, 2002³²




Predictably, the elderly represent a large portion of the high spenders: “People 65-79 (9 percent of the total population) represented 29 percent of the top 5 percent of spenders. Similarly, people 80 years and older (about 3 percent of the population) accounted for 14 percent of the top 5 percent of spenders. . .”³³ Alemayehu and Warner (2004) found (see Figure 13) that over people’s lifetimes, 8 percent of health care expenses:

...occurred during childhood (under age 20), 13 percent during young adulthood (20-39 years), 31 percent during middle age (40-64 years), and nearly half (49 percent) occurred after 65 years of age. Among people age 65 and older, three-quarters of expenses (or 37 percent of the lifetime total) occurred among individuals 65-84 and the rest (12 percent of the lifetime total) among people 85 and over. The total per capita lifetime expense was calculated to be \$316,600.³⁴

Age aside, the primary factors for determining the largest-spending consumers of health care depended upon several factors. First, the type of disease. According to the AHQR study, “The 15 most costly medical conditions in the United States accounted for 44 percent of total U.S. health care spending in 1996;” heart disease, cancer, trauma, mental disorders, and pulmonary conditions being the five most expensive diseases to manage.³⁵ Chronic conditions, such as asthma, are the other indicators of major expense.

Figure 13: Percent of Total Health Care Expenditures by Age Group, 2002³⁶



Those who are high spenders in one year, however, are not necessarily high spenders over the next several years:

Over longer periods of time, a considerable leveling of expenses takes place. In a study of Medicare enrollees, researchers found that although the top 1 percent of spenders accounted for 20 percent of expenses in a particular year, the top 1 percent of spenders over a 16-year period accounted for only 7 percent of expenses. The researchers concluded that there is a substantial leveling of expenses across a population when looking over several years or more compared to just a single year. An acute episode of pneumonia or a motor vehicle accident might lead to an expensive hospitalization for an otherwise healthy person, who might be in the top 1 percent for just that year but have few expenses in subsequent years. Similarly, many people have chronic conditions, such as diabetes and asthma, which are fairly expensive to treat on an ongoing basis for the rest of their lives, but in most years will not put them at the very top of health care spenders. However, each year some of those with chronic conditions will have acute episodes or complications requiring a hospitalization or other more expensive treatment.³⁷

The distribution of health expenditures provides important context from which to interpret the rising expenditure trends—especially with respect to which adverse incentives are driving the excessive cost increases. Due to the current demographic trends, the adverse incentives created by Medicare—as identified by Finkelstein (2007)—and especially the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, are key focus areas for any health care reform effort to be effective.

President Obama's Reforms Do Not Address the Root Causes of the Problem

The facts presented above have established that rising health care expenditures are limiting income gains and thereby hurting family budgets, raising tax costs, raising individuals' dollar costs at a rate that is not sustainable, and damaging the U.S. economy. The economic costs from these inefficiencies are large. One study estimates that the inefficiencies of the current system alone could account for 30 percent of the total health care spending in 2007:

Examining Medicare records, researchers have found that per-beneficiary spending varies widely from one area of the country to the next. In some areas, Medicare spends twice as much per senior as it does in other areas. Researchers have also found that beneficiaries in high-spending areas do not start out sicker, do not end up healthier, and are no happier with the care they receive, than beneficiaries in low-spending areas. That suggests that a significant amount of Medicare spending provides no discernible benefit to the program's intended beneficiaries. Those researchers estimate that as much as 30 percent of total U.S. medical spending provides no discernible value. If so, then Americans spend more than \$700 billion each year, or 5 percent of gross domestic product, on medical services of no discernible value.³⁸

Waste, fraud, and abuse created a large health care bill of \$700 billion in 2007. On a per capita basis, \$700 billion in waste, fraud, and abuse imposes a bill of over \$2,300 per legal resident in the U.S. The possibility that 30 percent of total health care spending is waste underscores the President's contention that reform is needed. However, successful reforms will directly address the root causes of the problems outlined above. The root cause is the adverse government policies that have diminished the incentives and ability for either doctors or patients to control costs and experiment with alternative, more effective ways to deliver health care.

The Obama Administration reverses this cause-and-effect relationship, positing that large numbers of the uninsured are driving health care costs higher. In reality, rising costs and a distorted health insurance market are limiting the insurance opportunities for millions of Americans. Implementing reforms true to President Obama's health care reform principles will create negative economic impacts that will exceed those negative impacts created by the current system.

As of this writing, neither the President nor the Democratic majority in Congress has settled on a specific detailed health reform plan. There are general concepts that guide their approaches. These concepts include:

- A public health insurance option to compete with the private sector;
- An individual or employer mandate requiring coverage;
- The establishment of health care exchanges where individuals can purchase health insurance, at discounted rates for certain individuals;
- Prohibition on rate differentiation based on health status, although differentiation by age is allowed (guaranteed issue); and
- Best practices mandates (such as an administrative body that disseminates comparative effectiveness information or electronic medical records) and the elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse.

None of these approaches address the problem at hand. The centerpiece of the Obama plan is the creation of a public health insurance option that supposedly would ensure that private insurance companies provide a fair product at a reasonable price. Such a solution is predicated on the problems being ineffective pricing and services from health insurance companies. As shown previously, this is not the problem.

The government rarely competes on a level playing field with private industry; instead, it tilts the field in its favor. A public health insurance option, with guaranteed taxpayer subsidies, would pressure the industry to price at uneconomical levels in order to meet political goals, regardless of their economic merit or viability. Private insurers would have no choice but to follow the government's lead—until forced to close up shop.

Florida's experience with storm (e.g., hurricane) insurance exemplifies the fate of health care insurance under the Obama plan. As everyone knows, hurricanes frequently batter Florida. Sometimes a given hurricane is particularly severe. Storm insurance provides protection for residents against significant or catastrophic wind damage caused by the occasional strong hurricane.

Originally, storm insurance plans were offered by both private insurers and the state government. Under Governor Charlie Crist, the state lowered its storm insurance rates to an actuarially unsound level. Under any reasonable scenario, the costs from storm insurance claims from the next large storm would overwhelm the insurance premiums collected and bankrupt any insurance fund that extended these rates. When combined with other market restrictions, the state all but ensured that insurance companies operating in Florida would lose money. In order to avoid bankruptcy, these companies have been leaving Florida. As a result, the state government has become the primary storm insurer. The state of Florida is now insuring millions of people and faces a financial crisis when the next major hurricane comes ashore.

The end result of the Obama plan on the health insurance market would be the same as in Florida's storm insurance market. The federal insurance program would drive out the private sector and become the primary health insurer in the United States. The U.S. health system would effectively become a single-payer, government-run health care system.

Fannie Mae (the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.) provide an example of how federal influence over public companies distorts the market and decreases its efficiency. While academics and researchers are still struggling to allocate blame over the housing bubble, it is already clear that too many homes were sold to too many individuals who could not afford them. In response, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac tightened standards on the types of mortgages it would guarantee and/or purchase. The latest initiative, announced in March 2009, has the effect of tightening credit standards for condominium purchasers, especially for purchases in developments likely soon to experience financial difficulties. After years of too-lax credit standards, tightening lending standards is the correct economic response, although it comes a bit late. It is the incorrect political response, however.

Representatives Barney Frank and Anthony Weiner complained to the CEOs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that these new restrictions "may be too onerous."³⁹ Whatever the congressmen's motive, their actions illustrate that when public companies make hard economic decisions, the political overseers inevitably intervene and second-guess the company's decisions. The interference—or threat of interference—in the daily operations of public companies forces these companies to consider the political ramifications of their actions in addition to their economic viability. Having to incorporate the latest political considerations decreases the effectiveness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and is another real-world example of how public corporations, subject to the whims of politicians, distort the markets in which they operate.

Similarly, congressmen and senators will have an incentive to pressure the CEO of some future public health insurance company whenever premium price increases are viewed by their political constituents as "too onerous." Greater economic inefficiencies will be the result.

Additionally, creating another government insurance plan would not address the problem of rising health care costs, even while it exacerbated other problems by further diminishing consumer incentives to monitor health care costs. Brown and Finkelstein's research (2008) suggests that the likely impact from a public insurance option is a significant reduction in people's incentives to monitor costs and a significant increase in the costs of administering the public program.

In addition to the public insurance option, the President's health care reform priorities would create public health insurance exchanges. In theory, health insurance exchanges provide people with the resources and information to make efficient insurance purchases. When combined with guaranteed issue* or some form of individual mandate, such policies are designed to ensure that all Americans have insurance coverage. Sometimes health insurance exchanges are sold as a free lunch that will simultaneously increase efficiency, expand coverage, and lower costs—at least over the "next decade."

Senator Edward Kennedy asked the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to evaluate a plan that contains these policies—the Affordable Health Choices Act. The CBO's reply

*Guaranteed issue means that applicants cannot be turned down for coverage based on their health status.

dispels the myths that health insurance exchanges, combined with an individual mandate, constitute effective health care reform. Specifically, the CBO stated:

According to that assessment, enacting the proposal would result in a net increase in federal budget deficits of about \$1.0 trillion over the 2010-2019 period. Once the proposal was fully implemented, about 39 million individuals would obtain coverage through the new insurance exchanges. At the same time, the number of people who had coverage through an employer would decline by about 15 million (or roughly 10 percent), and coverage from other sources would fall by about 8 million, so the net decrease in the number of people uninsured would be about 16 million.⁴⁰

Since the U.S. Census currently estimates that 45.7 million people did not have insurance in 2007, the net \$1 trillion in additional spending (\$1.6 trillion gross spending) would reduce the number of insured by only 35 percent. The initiative would leave 30 million people uninsured despite the government's expenditure of an additional \$1 trillion on net.⁴¹ The cost to reduce the number of uninsured by 16 million people is \$62,500 per each additional person insured.

That assessment is consistent with experience in Massachusetts following the state's recent health care reforms. The Massachusetts reform embodied the same main principles promoted by the Obama Administration—the health exchange, individual mandate, and generous subsidies. The state's legislature provided:

- Cost control by increasing the number of insured through both an individual and employer mandate;
- Generous middle class subsidies to cover insurance costs; and
- The creation of Massachusetts Health Connector, which is an exchange designed to connect individuals with the right insurance policy.

The individual mandates of Massachusetts did reduce the number of uninsured. A recent summary of the reforms put it this way:

In mid-2008, just 2.6 percent of state residents lacked insurance coverage, down from 9.8 percent in 2006, according to a state report:

Overall, 439,000 were newly insured. These included 72,000 added to MassHealth, the state's Medicaid program, which raised eligibility from 100 percent to 150 percent of the federal poverty level; and 176,000 in CommCare, a new subsidized program for those between 150 percent and 300 percent of poverty. Another 18,000 obtained insurance through CommChoice, the new state insurance "connector" offering standardized plans to individuals and small businesses, while 14,000 more bought individual policies on the open market. Many more obtained employer-sponsored coverage, particularly among lower-income workers.⁴²

But the same report also documents that these same reforms are bankrupting the state and creating many unintended and unwanted consequences including:

...escalating costs, growing concerns about underinsurance for some low- and middle-income groups, and an unintended but severe impact on some safety-net providers. If anything, many of these issues will be even more pronounced in states with higher uninsured rates and fewer available Medicaid dollars...

Original budget projections for the Massachusetts program were \$160 million in fiscal year 2007, \$400 million in FY2008 and \$725 million in FY2009. At \$133 million, actual costs came in lower for 2007, but shot up to \$625 million in 2008. The state funding request for 2009 was \$869 million, with some estimating that actual costs could reach \$1.1 billion. Much of the increase results from higher than expected enrollment in MassHealth and the subsidized CommCare programs, possibly because of underestimates of how many people would qualify. With the state about \$4 billion short of a balanced budget this year, sustaining these numbers is a huge challenge.⁴³

The benefits from expanding insurance coverage are also questionable. A recent Cato Institute report found that uncompensated care provided by hospitals and other medical facilities has not declined in proportion to the increase in the number of insured.⁴⁴ "In fact, one of the original selling points behind the Massachusetts reform was that it would shift subsidies for uncompensated care from hospitals to individuals. Uncompensated care subsidies were supposed to fade away, with the state using the savings to help low- and middle-income residents buy insurance instead. But hospitals now say that the rate of uncompensated care contin-

ues to be so high that they cannot dispense with their subsidies. The taxpayers end up paying twice.⁴⁵

The resultant pressure isn't on taxpayers and state budget architects alone. Although supporters claimed:

... reforms would reduce the price of individual insurance policies by 25-40 percent ... [i]n reality, insurance premiums rose by 7.4 percent in 2007, 8-12 percent in 2008, and are expected to rise 9 percent this year. By comparison, nationwide insurance costs rose by 6.1 percent in 2007, just 4.7 percent in 2008, and are projected to increase 6.4 percent this year. On average, health insurance costs \$16,897 for a family of four in Massachusetts, compared to \$12,700 nationally.⁴⁶

The Massachusetts reform is a case study that demonstrates the negative economic impact of health reform based on the President's principles of expanding coverage. Such an approach not only fails to address the adverse incentives driving up costs, it makes these incentives worse. The impact from the worsened economic incentives creates the additional adverse economic outcomes that will result from the President's reform concepts.

The last concept supported by President Obama addresses the outcomes of the adverse incentives (the symptoms) and not the actual adverse incentives themselves (the disease). The President discusses the need for best practices (such as an administrative body that disseminates comparative effectiveness information or electronic medical records) to be better shared across the medical profession. He also pledges the elimination of waste, fraud, and abuse. As an indication of his commitment to this cause, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the stimulus package) invested \$19 billion in health information technology, which included \$17 billion in incentives to encourage health care providers to use electronic medical records and \$1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.

As Cannon (2009) illustrated, the medical profession lacks adequate comparative effective research and other best practice sharing initiatives because government programs and price insensitive consumers have eliminated the incen-

tive to do so. Throwing money at this problem will not appreciably change this incentive. What it will do is create new problems such as the possibility that the "best practices" will come to mean politically, rather than medically, best. The more effective policy, which should be apparent by now, is to address the problem directly by correcting the adverse incentives that are causing the inefficient result.

Quantifying the Potential Economic Impacts

Because the concepts behind the Obama Administration's health care reform plans do not address the incentives in the current health care system—indeed, they often worsen these incentives—health reforms based on these concepts will have a significant negative economic impact. To quantify the impacts from reforms based on the Obama Administration's concepts, we focus on the impacts from a reform proposal that:

- Creates another public health care option that will directly compete with private health insurers;
- Establishes an individual mandate that requires all individuals to obtain health insurance coverage; and
- Creates a health care exchange.

We base our analysis on the CBO's assessment of the Kennedy health care plan mentioned above.* Because it is unlikely the Kennedy plan, as currently written, will be the final health care reform bill, we modify the CBO's analysis to reflect the impact on the health care reform market from a cumulative \$1 trillion in health care subsidies spent over the next 10 years. We assume that the \$1 trillion in health care subsidies will be spent in a similar manner, with similar timing, and will have impacts on the uninsured similar to those noted in the CBO analysis.


The purpose of the subsidies is to extend health insurance coverage to the current uninsured. Some of this money is duplicative, replacing private sector dollars currently being devoted toward health insurance coverage. By 2019, approximately \$4 out of every \$10 in the new subsidies

*Elmendorf, Douglas (2009) "Letter to Honorable Edward M. Kennedy" Congressional Budget Office, June 15. On July 2nd, the CBO analyzed another health care reform proposal from the Senate Committee on Health, Environment, Labor and Pensions, Elmendorf, Douglas (2009) "Letter to Honorable Edward M. Kennedy" Congressional Budget Office, July 2. While the price tag on this analysis is smaller (\$645 billion), it "... does not include a significant expansion of the Medicaid program or other options for subsidizing coverage for those with income below 150 percent of the federal poverty level..." Because leaving out lower income individuals appears to contradict the goals of health insurance reform in the first place, our analysis is based on the original Kennedy plan.

would be devoted toward those individuals who did not have coverage previously.

On net, assuming that the subsidies would be effective in 2012, the number of uninsured Americans would be approximately 25 percent smaller than it would have been otherwise without these subsidies. Thus, 13.3 million people who currently lack health insurance would acquire it. But as demonstrated above, expanding health insurance coverage fails to address the fundamental adverse incentives driving health care cost inflation. Consequently, reforms based on the President’s priorities would not only prove costly and ineffective at achieving his goals, they would actually aggravate current problems with the health care system. Expanding coverage in this manner would worsen the incentives by increasing the number of dollars spent that are insensitive to costs.


Figure 14: Projected Reduction in Uninsured from \$1 Trillion in Federal Subsidies, 2012-2019⁴⁷



Finkelstein (2007) demonstrated that, historically, health care expenditures increase rapidly when medical consumers are insulated from the financial costs from using the medical system (connection rate).⁴⁸ We estimate that the increased government subsidies would reduce the expected connection rate by approximately one percentage point. See Figure 15 for a year-by-year breakdown of the changes in the connection rate due to the new government subsidies.


The reduction in the connection rate directly creates incentives for additional medical expenditures that are insensitive to price. Based on the elasticity calculations from Finkelstein (2007), due to the reduced connection rates (and the additional adverse incentives created by the lower connection rates), total medical expenditures would actually accelerate. Figure 16 illustrates the estimated additional annual increases

Figure 15: Annual Percentage Change in Connection Rate Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies, 2012-2019⁴⁹



es in medical expenditures caused by the reduced connection rates, which would be 8.9 percent higher in 2019 than Obama-style reform would have enabled. Note that such increases are the exact opposite of what the proponents of President Obama’s health care priorities predict.

Figure 16: Additional Increase in Health Care Expenditures Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies, 2012-2019⁵⁰



This impact illustrates that health care reform that does not directly address the adverse incentives of the health care system will merely trade one set of bad alternatives for another.


In this case, if we assume \$1 trillion in government subsidies, an additional 13.3 million individuals who would not have had health insurance would have it—at a high cost, nonetheless—accelerating health care expenditures that increase health care inflation, pressure on federal and state budgets, reduction in workers’ wage growth, and lower overall economic growth.

A more fruitful approach addresses the root cause of the problem first; the adverse incentives driving the excessive

growth in health care expenditures. Only when this problem is addressed can the larger insurance problem be solved without transferring the costs from one group to another.

The increase in health care expenditures represents a shift out in the demand for medical services, but does not change any incentives that would simultaneously increase the supply of medical services. Rising demand in the face of stable supply leads to increasing prices. The historic relationship between rising expenditures and rising medical inflation indicates that by 2019, increased government intervention will drive health care inflation 5.2 percentage points higher than would have been the case without such intervention (see Figure 17).

Figure 17: Additional Increase in Medical Inflation Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies, 2012-2019⁵¹



Higher health care expenditures will also have disagreeable effects on federal and state budgets. Figure 18 shows total federal government expenditures increasing by over 5.5 percent of total federal expenditures, including direct expenditures on the new subsidies plus higher Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP expenditures that would accompany higher medical costs.

The additional government expenditures must be financed through either higher taxes or higher federal government deficits. Based on the CBO's expectation that the government deficit will increase over this period, we assume that these additional expenditures will simply increase the deficit dollar for dollar. This implies that by 2019, the federal budget deficit would be \$285.6 billion larger—24.6 percent more than it would have been without the health care reform (see Figure 19). The present value of the total additional federal spending that would occur based on Obama's health care reforms would be \$1.2 trillion or \$3,900 for every man, woman, and child in the country.

Figure 18: Increase in Federal Government Expenditures as Percentage of Total Estimated Government Expenditures Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies, 2012-2019⁵²




Figure 19: Increase in Federal Government Deficit with Increased Health Care Subsidies Compared to Current Expected Federal Government Deficit, 2012-2019 (billions \$)⁵³





Figure 20 summarizes the overall impact on the economy due to the increased government intervention in the health care market by comparing the total increase in government health care expenditures—following reforms based on President Obama's health care reform—to the total reduction in economic output these reforms will cause.

Meanwhile, the proposed reform would crowd out private economic activity due to higher taxes and the larger federal deficit needed to accommodate new spending for health care (see Figure 19). The higher government burden that would have to be borne by the private sector would diminish total economic activity.* By 2019, Obama-style health care would shrink economic activity (GDP) by 4.9 percent compared to the baseline scenario.

*For a detailed analysis of the negative impact between higher government tax burdens (specifically the government expenditure tax wedge) and economic activity please see: Arduin, Laffer & Moore *Econometrics* (2009) "The Economic Impact of Federal Spending on State Economic Performance: A Texas Perspective," Texas Public Policy Foundation, April 2009.

Figure 20: Reduction in GDP and Increase in Government Health Care Expenditures Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies Compared to Baseline Scenario, Cumulative Impact by 2019⁵⁴



The Economic Impacts of Obama-Style Health Care on Texas

Health care reforms based on President Obama’s priorities would affect each state differently. Each would experience lower overall economic activity as well as increased fiscal pressures on the state budget. In assessing the impact of Senator Kennedy’s proposed health care reform, which at the time did not include the expansion of Medicaid, the CBO stated:

... although the proposal would not change federal laws regarding Medicaid and CHIP, it would affect outlays for those programs. CBO assumes that states that had expanded eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP to people with income above 150 percent of the federal poverty level would be inclined to reverse those policies, because those individuals could instead obtain subsidies through the insurance exchanges that would be financed entirely by the federal government.

Other proposals address in different ways the situations of families in need. The House Tri-Committee Reform Proposal would force states to expand Medicaid eligibility to 150 percent of the poverty level and lock in current benefit levels. Although the federal government would cover new Medicaid enrollees under the plan, the lack of flexibility could damage Texas’ ability to manage its growing Medicaid costs. According to the CBO, the additional Medicaid coverage would cost the federal government an additional \$438 billion over 10 years, with the 10-year total cost of the health reform program still in the \$1 trillion range.


The Senate HELP plan would currently force states to expand Medicaid eligibility to 150 percent of the poverty level

as well—without compensating them for the increased expenditures after five years. Should that proposal pass, the CBO estimate of total national Medicaid costs suggests that Texas could be forced to spend an additional \$28 billion based on current spending patterns, and assuming the federal government does not reduce its current share of Medicaid spending.

We include the potential state Medicaid cost in the federal budget estimate rather than in the Texas budget estimate calculated below because it is unknown how the health care reform package will ultimately address this issue. Our calculations are based on the assumption that the costs of the expanded Medicaid population are covered by the federal subsidies. Consequently, the additional costs are reflected in the \$3,900 per person federal cost estimate.

The present value of the non-federally funded additional health care expenditures that the Texas state government will have to pay—if a health care reform based on President Obama’s priorities was passed—is \$8.89 billion, or \$365 for every resident in Texas. Figure 21 illustrates the annual increased medical expenditures that Texas would have to pay. These additional expenditures will need to be paid for through either higher taxes or spending cuts elsewhere in the budget.

Figure 21: Additional Non-Federally Funded Texas State Government Expenditures Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies (\$billions)⁵⁵



The cost on Texas could be higher, and the national cost lower, if the federal government pushes the financial responsibility for covering the expansion of lower income individual’s health insurance coverage off to the states. Such a move would shift a total of \$28.2 billion (the net present value being \$21.7 billion) in cost from the federal government to Texas taxpayers.

In either scenario, combining the per person federal costs with the per person Texas costs, the present value of new government expenditures will cost every resident in Texas \$4,265.

While this figure will hold true regardless of whether the federal or state government picks up the costs for expanding Medicaid, the source of funding for Medicaid expansion will have a major impact on the Texas state budget.

The bill passed out of the HELP committee expanded Medicaid to 150 percent of the poverty level and assumed that the federal government would pick up the cost of the expansion for the first five years and then phase it into the state Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP). The House bill assumes the federal government would cover the cost of expansion (which appears to be 133 1/3 percent of the poverty level) and did not address if/or when they would push it back to the states.


Congress must still reconcile the 150 percent vs. 133 1/3 percent of the poverty level and the five years vs. no time limit of turning the costs over to the state. Given their inability to cover the costs (latest CBO of HR 3200 still has \$239 billion deficit), states are in high jeopardy of having to assume the cost at least in five years. A significant caveat in the CBO analysis is that: "They do not include certain costs that the government would incur to administer the proposed changes and the impact of the bill's provisions on other federal programs."

In addition to this threat to the state budget, expansion of Medicaid eligibility may increase Medicaid costs in Texas due to the *Frew vs. Hawkins* lawsuit. That suit was based on inadequate access for Medicaid enrollees because the state's physician reimbursement was so low that not enough doctors would take Medicaid patients. Even after the reimbursement rate was increased 25 percent in 2007, the situation still exists. Rapidly expanding the number of those eligible for Medicaid is going to greatly exacerbate that problem, and could subject Texas to additional court-imposed Medicaid costs.

Access to care was negatively impacted in Massachusetts after universal care was implemented in 2006. Waiting times in Boston are double those in any other metropolitan area in the country. Massachusetts has more than twice the number of physicians per 100,000 population than Texas; therefore, even longer waiting times should be expected in Texas, effectively restricting access to care.

Regardless of the funding mechanism, Texas taxpayers and the Texas economy would suffer from the heavy costs imposed

Figure 22: Increase in Texas Tax Revenues and Reduction in Texas GDP Due to Increased Health Care Subsidies Compared to Baseline Scenario, Cumulative Impact by 2019⁵⁶



under these health care proposals. The economic impact on Texas illustrated in Figure 22 is similar to that the national impact in Figure 20. Texas' economy would shrink by 4.7 percent. This is slightly less than the impact on the national economy, due to Texas' more competitive economic landscape.

Additionally, because Texas does not have the option to run trillion dollar deficits, Figure 22 illustrates the cost of the additional \$2.1 billion in health care expenditures as a percentage of total tax revenues. Texas' tax collections would have to be 1.9 percent larger in order to cover the additional \$2.1 billion in health care expenditures in 2019. Again, this number does not include the additional cost to Texas of expanding Medicaid if the federal government fails to pick up the tab.

Solutions

The core problem behind the major crisis in the U.S. health care system is poor incentives for patients and medical providers. Neither patients nor medical providers have the proper incentives to increase health care quality and decrease its costs. In fact, consumers and medical providers have the opposite incentive due to issues such as defensive medicine or the government incentives that thwart the development of sound comparative effective research.

The result is skyrocketing health care costs that limit dollar wage growth, accelerate medical inflation, and increase the total government burden on the private sector. These costs impose a large burden on the U.S. economy and underscore the importance of effective health care reform.

An effective approach to reforming the health care system begins by addressing the incentives driving the unsustainable

rise in health care expenditures. Reforms based on President Obama's priorities fail to do this. Instead, if adopted, they would exacerbate what is wrong with the current health care system, causing total national health care expenditures and health care inflation to increase. Lower economic growth and increased government deficits would result.

Our analysis has shown that reform in the Obama manner would render U.S. citizens poorer and their federal and state governments sorely pressed for revenues. Just as important, the reforms based on the President's priorities are cost-ineffective with respect to expanding health insurance coverage, one of the primary goals of reform.

Reforming the problems with the current U.S. health care system is too important to do incorrectly. The guiding principle of beneficial health care reform should be that the current third-party/government-driven health care system needs to be changed, not enhanced. One objective of reform should be a simpler system. The extraordinary complexity of the current system not only frustrates health care providers and patients alike, but also adds to the cost. This complexity is also responsible for much of the waste in the system, which is estimated to be 30 percent of health care spending.

Rather than expanding the role of government in the health care market, Congress should implement a patient-centered approach to health care reform. A patient-centered approach focuses on the patient-doctor relationship and empowers the patient and the doctor to make effective and economical health policy choices. A patient-centered health care reform would:

- **Begin with individual ownership of insurance policies.** The tax deduction that allows employers to own your insurance should instead be given to the individual.
- **Leverage Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).** HSAs empower individuals to monitor their health care costs and create incentives for individuals to use only those services that are necessary.
- **Allow interstate purchasing of insurance.** Policies in some states are more affordable because they include

fewer bells and whistles; consumers should be empowered to decide which benefits they need and what prices they are willing to pay.

- **Reduce the number of mandated benefits that insurers are required to cover.** Empowering consumers to choose which benefits they need is effective only if insurers are able to fill these needs.
- **Reallocate the majority of Medicaid spending into simple vouchers for low-income individuals to purchase their own insurance.** An income-based sliding scale voucher program would eliminate much of the massive bureaucracy needed to implement today's complex and burdensome Medicaid system. It would also produce considerable cost savings.
- **Eliminate unnecessary scope-of-practice laws and allow non-physician health care professionals to practice to the extent of their education and training.** Retail clinics have shown that increasing the provider pool safely increases competition and access to care—empowering patients to decide from whom they receive their care.
- **Reform tort liability laws.** Defensive medicine needlessly drives up medical costs and creates an adversarial relationship between doctors and patients.

By empowering patients and doctors to manage health care decisions, a patient-centered health care reform would directly address the distortions weakening our current health care system and would simultaneously control costs, increase health outcomes, and improve the overall efficiency of the health care system.

Conversely, any health care reform based on President Obama's priorities would worsen the current inefficiencies in the health care system due to incorrect diagnosis of the problems with our health care system. If implemented, the President's reforms would significantly harm the health care system, patient welfare, and the economy overall. ★

About the Texas Public Policy Foundation

The Texas Public Policy Foundation is a non-profit, non-partisan, free-market research institute based in Austin. Our mission is to promote and defend liberty, personal responsibility, and free enterprise by educating policymakers and the public with academically sound research. More information on the Foundation can be found at www.texaspolicy.com.

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Arthur B. Laffer, Ph.D.

Dr. Arthur Laffer's economic acumen and influence in triggering a world-wide, tax-cutting movement in the 1980s have earned him the distinction in many publications as "The Father of Supply-Side Economics." Dr. Laffer was a member of President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board for both of his two terms (1981-1989). He was also a founding member of the Congressional Policy Advisory Board, a select group of advisors who assisted in shaping legislative policies for Congress between 1997 and 2002. He was the first to hold the title of Chief Economist at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) from October 1970 to July 1972.

Dr. Laffer was noted in *Time Magazine's* cover story "The Century's Greatest Minds" for inventing the Laffer Curve. He was listed in "A Dozen Who Shaped the 80s," in the *Los Angeles Times*, and in "A Gallery of the Greatest People Who Influenced Our Daily Business," in *The Wall Street Journal*. Dr. Laffer received a B.A. in economics from Yale University in 1963. He received a MBA and a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University in 1965 and 1972, respectively.

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Arduin offers extensive experience in bringing government spending under control through long-term policy planning and fiscally conservative budgeting. Governors have consistently received high marks on the Cato Institute's fiscal report cards during her tenure with their administrations. A graduate of Duke University, Arduin graduated *magna cum laude* with honors in economics and public policy.

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Dr. Winegarden manages Arduin, Laffer & Moore's policy studies and analyses and advises clients on the business implications from changes in government policies and economic trends including regulatory, tax, and fiscal policies. His economic trends research details the impact on clients and industries from current macroeconomic, market, and industry trends. Additionally, Dr. Winegarden performs economic impact analysis for proposed investment projects and legislative/regulatory proposals. Dr. Winegarden presents his research findings to clients, conferences, and in the media including *Bloomberg News* and *CNN-fn*.

Previously, Dr. Winegarden worked as an economist in Hong Kong and New York City for Altria Companies, Inc. His responsibilities included forecasting the economic trends for East-Asian Economies; creating economic, fiscal, and pricing models that were leveraged as part of the company's 5-year planning process; and managing the company's tax and budget analyses and government affairs argumentation. Dr. Winegarden also worked for policy and trade associations in Washington, D.C.

